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Abstract
Although past research has established the existence of strong social class
effects on the decision to undertake higher education in the UK, there is only
sparse empirical work investigating social class influences on the choice of degree
subject at the undergraduate level. We estimate trinomial probit models of un-
dergraduate degree subject enrolled for the period 1981-1991 using Universities’
Statistical Record data and generally find no social class effect. This finding
is robust to different ways to aggregate degree subjects and the use of alterna-
tive econometric models. Our analysis suggests that in a period pre-dating the
mass expansion of higher education, the replacement of student grants with stu-
dent loans and the introduction of undergraduate student tuition fees, the UK
university system granted equal opportunities to students from different social
classes in terms of the degree subject enrolled.
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3INTRODUCTION
Widening access to education is commonly viewed as an effective way of promot-
ing higher intergenerational mobility and the study of educational attainment has
received growing attention by economists. This is especially true for the UK where
the empirical analysis of educational attainment using micro data has a long tra-
dition. Several studies have investigated the determinants of the level of education
achieved (the number of years of schooling or the highest educational qualification)
using cross-section or longitudinal micro data. Some examples include Rice (1987),
Micklewright (1989), Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) and Chevalier and Lanot
(2002) among others. While previous studies have shown a substantial amount of
correlation between parents’ and children’s incomes and education,1 there is much
less empirical evidence on the effect of family and social background on the choice
of subject at tertiary level. However, in a period of increasing access to education,
a great deal of the variation in individuals’ labour market outcomes (employment
opportunities and earnings) may be determined by the type in addition to the level
of education achieved. Empirical evidence that supports the importance of field
of study as one of the main determinants of graduates’ performance in the labour
market is provided by several studies. Smith et al. (2000) and Bratti et al. (2004),
for instance, report significant differences in first destinations of graduates from
different subject fields. Large differences also exist in graduates’ earnings by degree
subject, as shown by Blackaby et al. (1999), Walker and Zhu (2001) and Chevalier
et al. (2002) among others.
Moreover, there is some concern about the lack of workers in high demand
fields, such as graduates in computer sciences and IT (see Mason, 1999). Hence, a
deeper understanding of the mechanism driving students’ choices is important also
to explain some apparent inefficiencies in the labour market and to forecast future
labour market trends.
Despite the potential interest of the topic, to the best of our knowledge, to
date there exists only one empirical study on undergraduate field of graduation in
the UK, van de Werfhorst et al. (2003), which analyses survey data for the 1958
British cohort. In the current paper, we aim to contribute to the existing literature
4on subject choice in the UK by extending the analysis to several cohorts of university
students (from 1981 until 1991), using administrative individual-level data. Unlike
many previous studies, we use cohorts of entrant students rather than cohorts of
students leaving with a university qualification and model subject choice allowing
for a non-zero correlation across the unobserved factors which might simultaneously
affect the utilities received from studying different disciplines. Furthermore, using
several cohorts of university students we also analyse the changes in social class
effects over time.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 gives an outline of the reasons why
social class should matter for the choice of degree subject. Section 2 briefly surveys
the existing literature. Section 3 describes the econometric model and section 4
discusses the main features of the data set and the sample used in our estimates.
Section 5 reports the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
1 SOCIAL CLASS INFLUENCES ON THE
CHOICE OF FIELD OF STUDY
The case for strong social class influences on educational choices has been put for-
ward by both sociologists and economists. Although the theoretical work has almost
exclusively focused on the level of education, the existing analytical framework can
also be applied to the choice of field of study.
Starting from the sociological literature, Boudon’s (1974) model of ‘rational
action’ states that educational choices depend on the perception of the costs and
benefits of each educational alternative available. For the choice of subject field,
a related hypothesis elaborated by Kelsall et al. (1972) is that low social class
students may be more inclined to choose subjects that offer better labour market
prospects. This could happen because future labour market outcomes depend more
on subject studied for low social class than for high social class students. The latter
are likely to enjoy good labour market outcomes once they get a university degree
irrespective of their field of graduation, thanks to ‘family networks’. Moreover,
Kelsall et al. (1972) also maintain that low social class students may tend to choose
5technical fields of study, which are closer to the occupational experience of many
manual working class parents. Boudon’s (1974) model closely resembles the one
commonly used by economists: Becker’s (1975) human capital theory. According
to Becker (1975) the costs and the returns of education are the main factors driving
educational choices. Some fields might be more closely linked to professions for
which the presence of ‘social networks’ (to which high social class students are
typically better connected) is more important to ensure labour market success and
a higher economic return of the educational investment. Then, the expected return
from different educational fields may differ accordingly over social classes. Previous
research has shown the existence of family networks effects. Hansen (2001), for
instance, found that the impact of social class on the economic rewards of education
varies across educational fields and tends to be largest in ‘soft’ educational fields
(such as social studies and humanities). Moreover, since in the presence of capital
market imperfections low social class individuals might have higher costs of enrolling
in HE,2 standard economic theory predicts that these individuals will require a
higher return from their investment in university education. The higher return
can be obtained by enrolling in subjects highly rewarded in the labour market.
Therefore, low social class students will choose relatively ‘high performing’ subjects
(in terms of earnings or employment prospects), a prediction very similar to that
elaborated by Kelsall et al. (1972). On the grounds of these considerations we
advance the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Low social class individuals are relatively more inclined to
enroll in ‘technical’ degree subjects than middle and high social class students
(Kelsall et al. 1972);
Hypothesis 2. Low social class individuals are more likely to enroll in subjects
which offer better labour market prospects, i.e. higher wages or better employment
opportunities, than middle and high social class students (Kelsall et al. 1972 and
Becker 1975).
Bourdieu’s (1984) ‘cultural reproduction hypothesis’ emphasizes the role of ed-
ucation as a means of reproducing social class. In this context education is the
instrument through which the high and middle social classes prevent individuals
from lower social backgrounds from accessing the highest positions in society. Two
6very important concepts for educational choices are those of ‘economic capital’ and
‘cultural capital’. As stressed by van de Werfhorst et al. (2001), according to this
hypothesis people from the economic elites prefer lucrative fields, which can en-
sure a comfortable life, while people from the cultural elites are less interested in
economic returns to education and prefer fields in which they can acquire ‘cultural
capital’. Then the following hypothesis can be put forward:
Hypothesis 3. High social class students are relatively more likely to enroll
in subjects which provide cultural capital, such as arts and humanities (Bordieu
1984).
This last hypothesis is also in line with hypothesis 2, since arts and humanities
are usually not very highly remunerated subjects.
We may expect that with an increased access to higher education the advantages
of having a degree for the upper class are progressively lost, and the type of degree
possessed becomes an important distinguishing factor for labour market and social
success. Highly prestigious professions, such as the legal and medical ones, offer
socially and economically advantageous positions in society, and control over these
professions becomes a valuable asset for the upper class. A theory leading to similar
conclusions exists also in the domain of economics: the ‘social networks’ model
elaborated by Montgomery (1991). Montgomery (1991) builds a theoretical model
to explain the large use of employee referrals as a device for screening job applicants,
starting from the observation that workers tend to refer others who are similar to
themselves (see Doeringer and Piore, 1971). His model explains “why workers
who are well connected (possessing social ties to those in high-paying jobs) might
fare better than those who are poorly connected and why firms hiring through
referral might earn higher profits” (Montgomery 1991, p. 1414). We may expect
that individuals from high social classes are better connected to people working in
high-paying jobs, their parents in primis. Then we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. High social class students are relatively more likely to enroll in
prestigious subjects, i.e. subjects leading to highly paid and often entry-regulated
professions, such as medicine and law. In the latter, the comparative advantage
of high social class individuals may stem from a direct control over the entry of
related professions (Bordieu 1984), or from the existence of social networks effects
7(Montgomery 1991).3
It is worth noting that the last hypothesis is in apparent contrast with hypoth-
esis 2 since graduates in medicine or law are usually very well paid. However, in
reality students may enroll in the subjects which ensure them the highest expected
returns conditional on their social class origins.
In the empirical analysis, we shall compare the empirical evidence with the
hypotheses outlined above and see which ones seem to better fit the data. Although
the hypotheses above suggest why social class may be important for the choice of
degree subject, they offer at the same time some counter arguments on the reasons
why we could find that social class differences were not significant in the period
under study. Some of these reasons could be:
1. individual preferences (or non-pecuniary costs) are not shaped by social class
but by factors unrelated to it. One such factor might be the performance in
specific subjects at secondary school;
2. given the increasing demand for graduates in the period under study, labour
market outcomes did not depend on social class, i.e. family networks were
not important and a university degree was sufficient to ensure a good labour
market outcome to all graduates (absence of heterogeneous returns to degree
subjects according to social class);
3. individuals had in the period under study the same (pecuniary) costs of
enrolling in different subjects. This might be the case since there were no
tuition fees for home students and student financial assistance was based on
means-tested maintenance grants for low-income students.4
Thus all factors above may have contributed to making very similar the behaviour
of individuals with different social origins.
2 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
In this section, we report a brief survey of the empirical research that investigated
university students’ choice of field of study at the undergraduate level and which
has also analysed the role of social class influences. To the best of our knowledge,
8there are only a handful of studies which have investigated social class effects using
individual-level data.
Oosterbeek and Webbink (1997) used data from the Netherlands in order to
analyse the decision whether or not to attend technical studies. The authors found
that children from high income families were less likely to enroll in technical fields,
but more likely to persist in their choice once they had undertaken a technical
education.
Davies and Guppy (1997) analysed the choice of field of study using US micro
data. They found that males were more likely than females to enroll in lucrative
fields of study. Moreover, high ability individuals and low social class individuals
were more likely to enter high-return fields.
Van de Werfhorst et al. (2001) using Dutch data found that children of the
cultural elite tended to choose fields where they could acquire ‘cultural capital’, i.e.
non technical fields, while students from the economic elite were under-represented
in cultural fields (such as arts and humanities). By contrast, low social class indi-
viduals were over-represented in economics and engineering, i.e. lucrative fields.
Rochat and Demeulemeester (2001) investigated the process of study field choice
using Belgian data. They found that students with fathers in ’elite’ occupations,
such as managers, civil servants or professionals, were relatively more likely to enroll
in short cycle artistic and pedagogical studies and long cycle curricula in engineering
and less likely to enroll in long cycle business, economics and social studies.
Montmarquette et al. (2002) estimated a multinomial logit model of subject
choice using Canadian micro data. They found no effect of having a parent in a
professional occupation, but that students supported by an educational loan were
more likely to choose those fields (education or liberal arts) in which the probability
of success was higher on average.
We are aware of only one paper investigating field of study at the undergraduate
level in the UK with an emphasis on social class and that is by van de Werfhorst
et al. (2003). The authors analysed the educational choices and the educational
performance of the 1958 British Cohort using data from the National Child Devel-
opment Study. Since there is only this study for the UK, it is worthwhile to devote
some space to summarizing the main findings. The focus of van de Werfhorst et
9al. (2003) is on the role of social class, cultural and economic capital and ability
on the subject choice in secondary and tertiary education in Britain. We comment
here only on the results relating to university education. Van de Werfhorst et al.
(2003) estimated a multinomial logit model of subject of graduation considering
six broad subject categories and including among the explanatory variables family
background variables (such as parental social class and measures of ‘economic capi-
tal’ and ‘cultural capital’), ability (verbal and mathematical ability), and measures
of comparative advantage (based on O-level subjects choice and performance). The
authors found that children from professional backgrounds preferred faculties of
medicine and law, even after controlling for ability at age 11 and exam perfor-
mance at age 16. However, they did not find other social class differences, which,
as they pointed out, is not due to the controls for various sorts of school attain-
ments since a model without age-11 and age-16 attainments also shows no other
social class effects. However, the authors themselves stated that the lack of a strong
social class effect might be due to the specific characteristics of the cohort studied.
In fact, at the time of the study only a very small minority of the working class
entered HE, and this could be considered as a very particular and selected group
(e.g., in terms of academic ability).
3 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
We assume that an individual can choose a subject group j among three differ-
ent alternatives, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, which will be defined in section 4.2, each of them
providing a utility of:
U0i = β
′
0Xi + 0i (1)
U1i = β
′
1Xi + 1i (2)
U2i = β
′
2Xi + 2i (3)
where i is the subscript for individuals. Xi is the vector of all individual ob-
served characteristics affecting the utility of each group and 0i, 1i, 2i the un-
observed components (errors) in these utilities. A possible way of modeling the
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choice is to use a multinomial logit model (MNL). However, a strong assumption
of the MNL is the independence of irrelevant alternatives, i.e. that the error terms
of the utilities associated with the alternatives are uncorrelated, an assumption
which contrasts with what we have seen in the previous section. However, some
factors affecting subject related utilities are often unobservable, and enter the error
terms ji’s thus generating a correlation between them. This typically happens
when using administrative data, which do not contain important information on
family background information, which is instead collected through survey data.
Therefore, in our case, it is evidently advantageous to use a trinomial probit model
(TNP) since the covariance matrix of the error terms is unrestricted. As suggested
by Bunch (1991) and Dansie (1985), among others, a convenient way of achieving
identification of the TNP is by normalizing one of the utilities to zero. This reduces
the dimensionality of the problem. By normalising to zero the utility of the first
alternative (U0i), our model becomes:
U0i = 0 (4)
U1i = β
′
1Xi + 1i (5)
U2i = β
′
2Xi + 2i (6)
where:
(
1i
2i
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρ12
ρ12 1
))
.
This model represents a formally identified TNP.5 As observed by Heckman and
Sedlacek (1985) the TNP is identified so long as Xi contains a single regressor that
varies across individuals and no exclusion restrictions are required for formal iden-
tification. However, as stated by Keane (1992) the TNP may suffer from ‘tenuous’
identification, and exclusion restrictions may contribute to improving the model
identification. The problem is likely to arise especially when considering the choice
among a number of alternatives higher than three. However, as often happens in
labour economics applications, our data set does not contain alternative-specific
variables, so no natural exclusion restrictions are available. Since theory does not
suggest any obvious exclusion restrictions for non-alternative-specific variables, i.e.
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variables affecting the utility of a specific alternative only, we can only estimate the
formally identified TNP without exclusion restrictions.6
The probabilities of the different outcomes are:
P (Y = 0) = P (U0 > U1, U0 > U2)
= P (1 < −β′1X, 2 < −β′2X)
= Φ2(−β′1X,−β′2X|ρ12) (7)
P (Y = 1) = P (U1 > U0, U1 > U2)
= P (1 < β
′
1X, 1 − 2 < −β′1X − β′2X)
= Φ2
(
β′1X,
β′1X − β′2X√
2− 2ρ12 |
1− ρ12√
2− 2ρ12
)
(8)
P (Y = 2) = P (U2 > U0, U2 > U1)
= P (2 < β
′
2X, 2 − 1 < −β′2X − β′1X)
= Φ2
(
β′2X,
β′2X − β′1X√
2− 2ρ12 |
1− ρ12√
2− 2ρ12
)
(9)
where we have omitted the subscript for the individual and Φ2(x1, x2|ρ12) is
the bivariate standard normal distribution of the two normal random variables 1
and 2 computed at the values x1 and x2, respectively, with correlation coefficient
ρ12.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the present section we describe the data set used, the choice of explanatory
variables and the econometric model.
4.1 DATA SET
In this paper we use individual-level data from the Universities’ Statistical Record
(USR). The USR was the institution in charge of the collection of the statistical
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returns from all university institutions in Great Britain which formerly received
Exchequer grants from the University Funding Council (UFC), together with cor-
responding institutions for the Queen’s University of Belfast and the University of
Ulster. The USR has stored data from the academic year 1972/1973 until 1993/1994
when it was replaced by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). HESA
data are generally comparable to USR data. However, the new data do not include
performance by type of A-level, which is likely to be a very important predictor of
students’ selection into fields of study, but provides only A-level score in the best
three passes. At the time of the study we had no access to HESA data, and despite
being a bit old, USR data provide nonetheless the picture of the UK university
system during a period pre-dating the big expansion of university education and
the steady shift in the burden of funding higher education away from the taxpayer
and towards students and their families that took place in recent years. Hence,
the analysis in this paper is limited to USR data and ‘old’ universities, i.e. to the
institutions with a university status before the abolition of the binary divide be-
tween universities and polytechnics that took place in 1992. The USR data are rich
in information concerning the academic life and prior educational qualifications of
students and include entire cohorts of students leaving Universities each year.
Using different cohorts of university leavers, it is possible to re-construct the
cohorts of entrant students in each academic year. We did it for the academic years
1981-1991. Hence, unlike other papers which use samples of university leavers,
in particular students leaving with a university qualification, in this paper we use
cohorts of entrant students. We think that this is more appropriate to investigate
factors related to the choice of degree subject. Indeed, obtaining a degree in a
specific subject is only the final outcome of several processes, namely the choice
to enroll in a certain field, that of remaining in the same field along the course,
and that of students’ progression. Therefore, it is difficult to isolate the effect of
the explanatory variables on each of these single processes by analysing cohorts
of leaving students. In this paper, we aim to analyse the first subject in which
students enrolled and accordingly use cohorts of entrant students.
We are aware of the fact that observing an individual enrolled in a certain field
implies that he/she has received an offer by a university, and therefore that also the
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supply side is important. However, we have no individual-level data on the subject
preferences stated by students at the application stage. We observe only students’
revealed preferences. In this sense, we assume that all students have the same initial
choice set (the complete set of subject fields), that they apply for their preferred
subset of fields and/or institutions and receive offers by one or more universities.
Then they make their final decision based on this restricted set of offers. Hence,
although the final choice is the student’s one, the process leading to it is complex
and is the result of the interactions between students and universities. This should
be kept in mind every time we talk of students’ choices in this paper. However,
we would like to add that there is some evidence suggesting that our analysis of
students’ enrolled subject is very close to one of students’ subject choice. In a recent
article Leslie (2003) uses Universities’ College Admissions Service (UCAS) data to
build an indicator of quality of subjects. The author uses UCAS data for 1996-
2001 and observes that ‘each applicant is permitted to make up to six applications
(except in medicine, which is restricted to four). Usually these six applications
are in a well-defined subject area, but they need not to be so.’ (p. 330-331).
Another possible criticism to our analysis is that it might confound the effect of
social class on subject choice with that on the probability of receiving an offer and
accepting it. However, as Leslie (2003) observes, entry qualifications, especially
A-levels score, are the key determinant of applicants’ success and no other family
or social background effects emerge. Therefore, on the basis of this evidence we
can argue that in our model we are mainly estimating the effect of social class on
applications rather than on offers and acceptances.
It must be noted that since the USR gathers information on university students
only, all the empirical analysis that follows is conditional on enrollment in HE7 and
seeks to answer the following question: although there are social class differences
in access to HE, once individuals from different social classes decide to enter HE,
do they enroll in similar subjects?
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4.2 SAMPLE DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATIS-
TICS
From the cohort of students in each year 1981-1991, we select only non-mature
students (students less than 21 when they entered HE), studying full time for a
degree qualification and we exclude overseas and married students. Moreover, since
in our specification we want to control for the type and the level of performance
at secondary school, we consider only students with A-level qualifications.8 For
the definition of the subject groups we take into account the predictions of the
different hypotheses outlined in section 1 and the need to keep the econometric
model estimable,9 and aggregate all subjects in the following three broad subject
areas:
1. ‘Non-quantitative subjects’ (abbreviated as NQS hereafter): Social Stud-
ies (excluding Economics), Mass Communications and Documentation, Lan-
guages and Related, Humanities, Creative Arts, Education, Combined de-
grees not included in the following category;
2. ‘Quantitative subjects’ (abbreviated as QS hereafter): Biological Sciences,
Agriculture and Related, Physical Sciences, Mathematical Sciences and In-
formatics, Engineering and Technology, Architecture, Building and Planning,
Economics, Business and Administration Studies, General Sciences Com-
bined degrees;
3. Law and Medicine (L&M hereafter): Law, Medicine and Dentistry, Subjects
Allied to Medicine.
In the period 1981-1991, the number of students satisfying our sample selection
criteria rose by about 19%, from 48,024 to 57,096 units. However, the rise has
been unevenly distributed across social classes, with students from social classes
I and V,10 for instance, rising only by 3.5% and decreasing by 1.2%, respectively,
and those from social classes II, IIINM, IIIM and IV, rising by 25.2, 39.1, 9.15 and
52.3 percentage points,11 respectively. The increase in the number of students was
more equally distributed across subject groups. Both QS and NQS experienced an
increase of around 20 percentage points, while the increase in L&M was about 7
15
percentage points lower.12
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on mean A-level score of entrant
students by subject,13 which can be interpreted as a raw measure of subject se-
lectivity. L&M always ranked first in terms of mean A-level score of the student
intake, while the second place was occupied by quantitative subjects until 1986 and
by non-quantitative subjects from 1987 onwards.
Table 2 shows average gross weekly occupational earnings of cohorts of student
leavers since 1985.14 For the whole period L&M ranked first in terms of average
earnings, followed by quantitative and non-quantitative subjects, respectively. The
coefficients of variation of earnings by study field generally show in the period of
study a lower variation within QS, and a similar amount of earnings variation within
the other subjects.
4.3 CHOICE OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
The primary focus of this paper is on the effect of social class on the choice of un-
dergraduate degree subject. Previous research has identified secondary school cur-
riculum (Polachek, 1978), gender (Polacheck, 1978, Blakemore and Low, 1984) and
forward-looking factors (Berger, 1988, Rochat and Demeulemeester, 2001, Mont-
marquette et al., 2002) as the main determinants of undergraduate field of study.
In the present paper, we estimate a ‘value added specification’ of the subject
choice model (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) and do not consider the effect of forward-
looking factors, such as expected incomes and academic performance. We decide
to do so for several reasons. Firstly, past research has shown that the expected
life-time flow of earnings is much more important than starting earnings for stu-
dents’ subject choice (see Berger, 1988) and that this flow is highly uncertain to
students (see Wolter and Zbinden, 2002), while from USR data it is possible to
have information on graduates’ early occupational earnings only (i.e. six months
after graduation, using the First Destination Supplement). In the absence of data
on subjective earnings expectations by students, the construction of life-time sub-
ject specific expected earnings would require a substantial amount of discretion and
assumptions on the part of the researcher.15 Given that the inclusion of expected
academic performance raises similar problems, the latter is also excluded from the
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present analysis. It must also be noted that our model is a reduced form model
and therefore of descriptive nature. We want only to investigate whether there
are statistically significant social class differences in the probability of enrolling
in different subjects. Then, these differences may be originated by very different
factors such as differences in preferences or in the expected economic returns and
costs of enrolling in different subjects, but unfortunately we do not have enough
information to identify the various channels through which social class may exert
its influence.
In detail, we include among the explanatory variables: gender, age at enroll-
ment, secondary school type (not known, grammar, independent, comprehensive,
6th form college, other type), score in A-levels in specific subjects (biology, chem-
istry, economics, English, French, general studies, geography, history, mathematics,
physics),16 number of A-levels, best three A-level passes score, region of residence
prior to university enrollment (inner London, outer London, other England, Scot-
land, Wales, Northern Ireland) and social class (I, II, IIINM, IIIM, IV, V, armed
forces, non-workers, inadequately described).17
4.4 MODELS’ FIT
Table 3 reports some statistics for the TNP models estimated for the period 1981-
1991. For all years, the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on
all regressors but the constant are equal to zero is strongly rejected. The Wald
tests for the omission of the variables related to social class and pre-university
school curriculum show that both sets of variables cannot be omitted from the
model. However, it is the latter group of variables which accounts for most of the
explanatory power of the model as the pseudo R2 of the models with and without
pre-university school variables show. Last but not least, in all years the estimated
correlation ρ12 between the error components of the utilities (see section 3) of the
QS and L&M groups is significantly different from zero, suggesting that the TNP
model has to be preferred to a MNL model.
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE EFFECT OF
SOCIAL CLASS
In this section we comment on the estimated probabilities obtained from the TNP
model.
The predicted probabilities of enrolling in the three different subject areas by
social class are reported for each year in Table 4 and are computed as the means of
the individual predicted probabilities. Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals
are computed using the delta method and Z critical values. We focus here only on
the differences by social class.
Firstly, although Table 3 shows that social class variables are jointly highly
significant, we observe in Table 4 that the predicted probabilities of enrolling in the
different subject groups are generally not statistically different across social classes
(i.e. confidence intervals overlap). Apart from statistical differences, we observe
that some predictions of the theory are met by the data. In all years considered,
except 1982, individuals from social class I had the smallest probability to enroll in
QS (cf. hypothesis I in section 1). By contrast, the same individuals had in all years
but 1991, the highest probability to enroll in Law and Medicine (cf. hypothesis IV
in section 1). However, the differences are very low in magnitude and this influences
their statistical significance. Moreover, there does not appear to be any dramatic
change in the likelihood of enrolling in the different subject groups in the period
under study.
Thus, our analysis appears to show that the structure of the UK higher educa-
tion system during the period 1981-1991 was able to ensure that individuals with
different social backgrounds had equal opportunities of accessing different subjects
at tertiary level (conditional on accessing HE). Recall that the system was char-
acterized by the absence of undergraduate tuition fees and by the provision of
means-tested maintenance grants for economically disadvantaged students. Both
these features of the UK higher education system were likely to attenuate differ-
ences across social classes in the probability of enrolling in the different subjects
by making the pecuniary costs of enrolling in the different fields very similar across
social classes and subjects. Moreover, in a period in which the number of gradu-
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ates was not very high, possessing a degree was probably sufficient per-se to ensure
high earnings in the labour market and more important than social class origin.18
On the basis of these results it might be interesting to replicate our analysis for
more recent years, since the 1990s were characterized by a gradual substitution of
the maintenance grants with repayable loans. As stated by Callender (2003) the
replacement of student maintenance grants with subsidised loans marked a switch
from a system granting a large subsidy to lower income students to a less generous
system benefiting all students. Although student loans might be very close to im-
plementing perfect capital markets, since students can borrow against their future
incomes at a zero real interest rate, they are surely less generous than maintenance
grants for low income students. In particular, their introduction may have had
some consequences not only on student access to HE but also in terms of differen-
tiating students’ choices across social classes. Low income students, who are more
risk adverse, might have preferred to enroll in less selective and “easier” subjects,
in which the probability of failure is lower or that of achieving a ‘good’ (first or
upper second) degree class higher, given the growing importance of degree class
over time (see Naylor et al. 2003), or to enroll in the subjects in which there is less
earnings dispersion. Evidence in this direction is implicitly provided by Metcalf
(2005) who finds that the introduction of home students tuition fees in 1998 in-
creased student debt (circa the same amount of fees) in particular for students who
did not receive financial support from their parents, and term time employment for
the same category of students. Moreover, term time employment was more popular
among students in less demanding courses, such as social sciences and humanities.
As to student’s satisfaction with respect to the university experience, student debt
was the primarily cited cause of regret. Overall this evidence suggests that low
income students might decide to enroll in the less time demanding courses in order
to be able to work during term time and also accumulate more debt and be dis-
satisfied with their university education after getting a degree. Moreover, Pitcher
and Purcell (1998) using data from the ‘Great Expectation’ survey of UK final year
undergraduates in 1996 found that three quarters of students in their sample accu-
mulated a debt of more than £ 500 while studying and that about one third of this
group felt that they would have had to take any kind of employment in order to
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pay their debts with negative consequences for their careers.19 This problem might
have become worse after the introduction of student fees in 1998. And, of course,
it would also be interesting to study the consequences of imposing top-up fees and
of differentiating the fees by subject, which have the potential of producing further
unequalising effects on the choices of students from different social classes.
The bulk of explanatory power of our model of subject choice can be ascribed
to the type of pre-university school curriculum and performance, proxied by the A-
levels score, number of A-levels, school type and type of A-levels with the relative
performance. The drop in the pseudo R2 when these variables are omitted (see
Table 3) shows that they have a high explanatory power over and above social class
(as the models with full controls show), which in turn has only a limited influence
on pre-university school curriculum. Indeed, the explanatory power of social class
remains low also when secondary school variables, on which the former may have
an influence, are not controlled for. This confirms the findings by van de Werfhorst
et al. (2003) and is relatively good news in terms of intergenerational mobility and
equal educational opportunities of the UK university system in the 1980s as far as
subject choice is concerned: social class did not appear to be the main determinant
of students’ differences of undergraduate subject studied. Our analysis appears to
implicitly attribute a major role to other individual or family characteristics, such
as parenting quality or students’ ability and motivation, or to quality of schools
and teachers, which affect the type of secondary school curriculum and A-level
performance. However, we do not exclude that there might have been other forms
of educational inequalities across social classes, for instance, in terms of the type of
institution enrolled (polytechnics vs universities, Russel group institution vs other
universities).20
5.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We have seen that our econometric analysis excludes the presence of statistically
significant differences across individuals from different social classes on the prob-
ability of enrolling in different subject groups. However, we may wonder whether
there are differences within broadly defined subject groups, and whether the results
are determined by the specific econometric model chosen.
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We address both issues by considering a more detailed definition of subject
groups. In particular: Medicine, Law, Sciences, Technical, Economics and Busi-
ness, Mathemathics, Soft Social Sciences, Art and Humanities.21. Since the high
number of subject groups considered does not allow the estimation of a multino-
mial probit model, we use instead a flexible-thresholds ordered probit model (see
the Appendix). However, estimation of such a model requires an ordering of the
discrete dependent variable. We ranked the subjects in ascending order of occu-
pational weekly earnings. In particular, we matched 1985-1991 university students
leavers data from the USR with occupational earnings from the NES survey and
computed an average of the occupational earnings by subject group. On the basis of
the average weekly occupational earnings in each year the subjects were ordered to
estimate the flexible-thresholds ordered probit model. The ranking of the subjects
is shown in Table 5 and is very similar across years. We report in Tables 6-7 the
estimates for a benchmark year, 1985.22 Concerning 1985, it must be noted that
the ordering by weekly occupational earnings of the broader subject groups shown
in Table 2 is generally preserved (i.e. Law and Medicine graduates had higher
earnings than all QS graduates who in turn earned more than NQS graduates), the
sole exception being Sciences, whose graduates were at the bottom of the earnings
distribution. Table 6 shows that by considering a finer disaggregation of subject
groups, imposing an ordering and using a different econometric model our results
do not change: differences across social classes are never statistically significant.
Moreover, Table 6 shows that when we compute the aggregate probabilities of the
broader subjects considered in the previous section (QS, NQS, Law and Medicine)
by summing the probabilities of the finer subjects, they are very similar to those
obtained from the TNP model. In summary, our results do not appear to be driven
by the aggregation of subjects or by the type of econometric model chosen.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we investigated social class influences on degree subject choice at the
undergraduate level, conditional on enrolling in HE in the UK. We have used data
for several cohorts of university students in the 1980s and early 1990s to estimate a
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trinomial probit model of subject choice (Quantitative Subjects, Non-Quantitative
Subjects, Law and Medicine). We have also considered a finer disaggregation of
subjects and an alternative econometric model (a flexible-thresholds ordered probit)
and showed the robustness of our results. From our empirical analysis:
1. We do not find statistically significant differences among social classes in the
probability of enrolling in different subjects in the period 1981-1991.
2. In the ‘value added specification’ of our model (i.e., controlling for secondary
school variables, see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) social class explains only a small
part of the variation in subject enrolled, while secondary school curriculum
(school type, A-level score and number and performance in specific A-levels)
has a much higher explanatory power. The explanatory power of social class
remains low also in a ‘contemporaneous specification’ of the model of subject
enrolled, where secondary school variables are omitted, suggesting that its
role may be limited also at early stages of the educational process.
Both findings can be interpreted as good news in terms of intergenerational
mobility of the UK university system during the 1980s as far as subject choice is
concerned, in the sense that a student’s choice of study field was made on the basis
of characteristics generally unrelated to social class.
For future research, it would be interesting to replicate the analysis in this paper
for more recent cohorts of university students using HESA data. Indeed, the recent
changes in the UK university system, such as the gradual replacement of student
maintenance grants with student loans and the introduction of tuition fees in 1998
may have contributed to differentiating the degree subject choices of students with
different social class backgrounds and give some useful insights into the potential
effects of introducing top-up fees and fees differentiated by subject from 2006.
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Notes
1For some studies related to intergenerational mobility in Britain see Dearden et al.
(1997), Blanden et al. (2003) and Machin and Gregg (2003), among others. Machin
and Gregg (2003) observe, for instance, that the educational expansion of the late 1980s
early 1990s benefited especially high social class students, contributing to a decrease in
intergenerational mobility.
2Because they need to borrow and pay back student loans while high social class stu-
dents usually have access to cheaper, even free, family resources to finance higher educa-
tion.
3Using Universities’ Statistical Record data for the UK, Mancini (2003) finds, for in-
stance, that working class graduates in law are significantly more likely to be unemployed
than their wealthier peers.
4See Blanden and Machin (2004) for an outline of recent changes in the UK system
of Higher Education. In brief, the expansion in the UK education system was partly
implemented by reducing the generosity in student support. In particular, the major
changes were the freezing of maintenance grants in 1990 and their progressive replacement
with subsidised loans; the introduction of home students undergraduate fees of 1,000
pounds per year, the increase in the maximum loan and the introduction of an income-
contingent repayment system following the 1997 Dearing Report. Beginning from 2006,
universities that meet some requirements will be able to charge top-up fees which may
reach a maximum of 3,000 pounds.
5The assumption that also the variance of the second error term is one is not strictly
necessary, but is often found in empirical applications since it helps the model estimation.
In this case we assume that the error terms in the equations 5 and 6 are standard normal.
6For a review on the multinomial probit model see also Weeks (1997).
7Such as all the literature reported in section 2.
8Since we want to focus on the choice of a typical student and investigate the effect of
his/her parental background, the decision to restrict the analysis to non-mature students,
studying full-time, i.e. individuals for which study is the main activity and who are likely
to be more affected by their parental and social background is natural. Mature students
may have enrolled in HE after working for a period and have accumulated the financial
resources necessary to enroll in HE, in any case they are likely to be more independent
of their families. Moreover, the USR data do not provide family background information
for mature students. We exclude students with non-traditional entry qualifications into
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HE since the level of secondary school performance, which we consider as a control for
students’ ability, is not available. However, A-level entrants represent the vast majority
of university students in the period studied (1981-1991).
9See section 3.
10Some abbreviations commonly used in the UK for social classes are: I (professional),
II (intermediate), IIINM (skilled non manual), IIIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled),
V (unskilled). In the USR data social class was built using parents’ occupation. We are
grateful to Abigail McNight for providing us with the mapping information.
11The high increase in social class IV is, however, partly determined by the low initial
number of students with this social background in 1981.
12Although the figure for this group reflects the slower dynamic for Medicine, since the
number of medical students is determined by the Government.
13A-level scores are computed according to the UCAS method: A=10, B=8, C=6, D=4,
E=2.
14The author wishes to thank Abigail McNight, Robin Naylor and Jeremy Smith for
providing data on earnings. Weekly occupational earnings are obtained by matching First
Destination Supplement data, in the USR, with data from the New Earnings Survey. See
Bratti and Mancini (2003) for a more detailed description of the matching procedure.
15Some studies, such as Dominitz and Manski (1996), Betts (1996), and Brunello et al.
(2001), cast doubts on students’ ability to predict their life-time future earnings. These
studies generally show a large heterogeneity in students’ beliefs about current earnings,
which reflects a large variation in students’ information. Finally, as noticed by Dominitz
and Manski (1996): ‘incorrect assumptions can yield incorrect inferences about the way
students make schooling decisions’ (p. 3).
16In order to keep the model tractable we choose to include only the most popular
subjects for which a score as well as a pass indicator is available.
17For the explanation of the abbreviations for social classes see footnote 10.
18Compared to a situation in which the supply of graduates is high and ‘family networks’
may be important for employers to screen among graduates.
19Stewart and Swaffield (1999), for instance, using UK data find that the probability of
being low paid depends on low pay in the previous year.
20This may happen since there are positive economic returns to attending prestigious
Universities as shown by Chevalier and Conlon (2003).
21The composition is: Medicine, Law, Sciences (Biological Sciences, Agriculture, Phys-
ical Sciences, General Sciences Combined degrees), Technical (Computing, Engineering,
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Technology, Architecture), Economics and Business, Mathematics, Soft Social Sciences
(Social studies excluding economics, Politics, Mass Communications, General Social Sci-
ences Combined degrees), Art and Humanities (Classics and Literature, Modern Euro
Languages, Other Languages, Humanities, Creative Arts, Education, Other combined de-
grees).
22The same sensitivity analysis was also replicated for 1991 and showed the same results.
25
APPENDIX. THE FLEXIBLE-THRESHOLDS OR-
DERED PROBIT MODEL
In this section, we offer an economic rationalization for the flexible-thresholds
ordered probit (FT-OP, hereafter) model, introduced by Pradhan and van Soest
(1995), in the spirit of Cameron and Heckman (1998). An individual has to choose
an undergraduate subject among a group j = 1, ..., J of possible alternatives. Given
the individual’s characteristics xi the cost (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) of
enrolling subject j is c(j|xi) while the benefit of enrolling in the same subject is
R(j|xi, i) where i is a person specific shifter of the return to field j. The subjects
are such that high return study fields also imply higher costs, e.g. the highly re-
warded subjects are also the most selective. Therefore both c(j|xi) and R(j|xi) are
increasing in j (i.e. subjects are ordered in increasing order of returns and costs).
We define the utility for individual i in subject j, i.e. Vij , as the difference between
the return and the cost of acquiring education in field j. The optimal field of study
is determined for each individual by solving the problem:
Max
j
[R(j|xi, i)− c(j|xi)] (10)
where j = 1, ..., J , and J is the field with the highest economic return (which does
not necessarily imply that it is also the highest utility field for individual i).
Let us assume that i is stochastic and continuously distributed, such that
i ⊥ xi and:
c(s|xi) =
s∑
j=1
exp(δ1)
j∏
z=2
exp(δj(xi)) (11)
while
R(s|xi, i) = i
s∑
j=1
exp(φ1)ψ(xi)
j∏
z=2
exp(φj(xi)). (12)
Hence, in this case both cost and return depend on individuals’ characteristics.
We assume that students enroll in the field which maximize their utility. If 1 < s <
J is the optimal undergraduate field for individual i, then:
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exp(δ1)
∏s
j=2 exp(δj(xi))
exp(φ1)
∏s
j=2 exp(φj(xi))ψ(x)
≤ i ≤
exp(δ1)
∏s+1
j=2 exp(δj(xi))
exp(φ1)
∏s+1
j=2 exp(φj(xi))ψ(x)
. (13)
By further assuming that φj(xi) = exp(φ
′
jxi) and δj(xi) = exp(δ
′
jxi) and
ψ(xi) = exp(xiβ) the last expression can be rewritten as:
exp(δ1)
∏s
j=2 exp(exp(δ
′
jxi))
exp(φ1) exp(xiβ)
∏s
j=2 exp(exp(φ
′
jxi))
≤ i ≤
exp(δ1)
∏s+1
j=2 exp(exp(δ
′
jxi))
exp(φ1) exp(xiβ)
∏s+1
j=2 exp(exp(φ
′
jxi))
.
(14)
If we define exp(ls(xi)) ≡ exp(δ1−φ1)
∏s
j=2 exp((δj −φj)′xi), δj −φj ≡ λj and
assume that i is standard log-normally distributed,
Pr(j = s|X = xi) = Φ
[
λ1+
s∑
j=2
exp(λ′jxi)−β′xi ≤ µi ≤ λ1+
s+1∑
j=2
exp(λ′jxi)−β′xi
]
.
(15)
where µi = ln(i) and Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function, we obtain
the flexible-thresholds ordered probit model introduced by Pradhan and van Soest
(1995). The thresholds ls(xi) are allowed to depend on individual characteristics
xi. As Pradhan and van Soest (1995) observed, this model allows greater flexibility
compared to the standard ordered probit model. Indeed, model identification only
requires one threshold to be fixed. Therefore the generality of the model can be
increased by letting the other thresholds depend on individual characteristics. In
particular, while the choice of the lowest return field depends on the index β′xi
only, the choices of the other subjects also depend on the λ′jxi’s indexes. Despite
being more flexible than the ordered probit model the flexible-thresholds ordered
probit model requires the ordering of the outcome variable and it is therefore less
general than a multinomial probit model although much easier to estimate.
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Tables
Table 1: Average A-level score of entrant students by subject (USR data)
Year QS NQS L&M
mean c.v. mean c.v. mean c.v.
1981 20.418 0.308 20.220 0.292 23.774 0.195
1982 21.130 0.281 21.071 0.264 24.214 0.179
1983 22.020 0.247 21.699 0.237 24.663 0.161
1984 22.123 0.250 21.849 0.237 25.027 0.155
1985 22.076 0.255 21.657 0.239 25.055 0.157
1986 21.947 0.259 21.774 0.234 25.140 0.153
1987 21.728 0.266 21.897 0.231 24.910 0.164
1988 21.794 0.268 21.971 0.231 25.015 0.161
1989 21.883 0.270 22.324 0.214 25.199 0.158
1990 21.939 0.269 22.631 0.208 25.097 0.164
1991 21.710 0.277 23.129 0.197 25.110 0.172
Note. QS: ‘Quantitative Subjects’; NQS: ‘Non-Quantitative Subjects’; L&M: Law and
Medicine (see section 4.2). The table reports average A-level scores of entrant students by
subject and the coefficient of variation (c.v.) within subject groups. The average A-level
score are computed on the estimation samples (i.e. non-mature, non-overseas, unmarried
students studying for a first degree qualification and with A-levels).
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Table 2: Average gross weekly occupational earnings of leaving students by
subject - 3 groups
Year QS NQS L&M
mean c.v. mean c.v. mean c.v.
1985 445.5 0.2 430.5 0.2 564.6 0.2
1986 487.1 0.2 468.0 0.2 612.1 0.2
1987 537.4 0.2 524.8 0.2 699.8 0.2
1988 598.7 0.2 567.9 0.2 785.6 0.2
1989 656.6 0.2 626.9 0.2 871.6 0.2
1990 677.1 0.2 661.3 0.2 980.9 0.2
1991 710.7 0.2 690.8 0.3 1044.7 0.3
1992 735.7 0.2 716.2 0.3 1071.4 0.3
1993 761.4 0.2 747.1 0.3 1085.3 0.3
Note. QS: ‘Quantitative Subjects’; NQS: ‘Non-Quantitative Subjects’; L&M: Law and
Medicine (see section 4.2). The table reports average gross weekly occupational earnings
in current pounds (from the New Earnings Survey) of leaving students by subject and
the coefficient of variation (c.v.) within subjects. Average earnings are computed on the
estimation samples (i.e. non-mature, non-overseas, unmarried students studying for a first
degree qualification and with A-levels).
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Table 3: Model diagnostics
Statistics Years
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Log-likelihood -27,978.0 -26,887.6 -26,231.0 -26,826.2 -27,787.3 -27,678.0 -28,038.7
Wald test: overall significance(a) 13,752.1 13,718.4 14,206.0 14,677.4 16,015.6 16,027.0 15,872.1
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: social class(b) 80.80 203.98 97.76 52.66 98.29 113.92 95.19
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: pre-university variables(c) 12,224.1 12,455.7 13,035.9 13,357.4 14,645.2 14,590.8 14,424.0
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: school type(d) 120.3 88.6 46.8 88.8 78.8 113.3 110.4
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2:(e)
i. model with secondary education 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40
ii. model withouth secondary education 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
ρ12
(f) 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.61
(s.e.) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
N. observations 48,024 45,837 44,412 45,336 47,601 46,568 46,914
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continued
Statistics Years
1988 1989 1990 1991
Log-likelihood -28,905.1 -31,239.1 -33,443.6 -34,060.5
Wald test: overall significance(a) 17,243.3 19,522.9 20,236.2 22,006.7
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: social class(b) 86.91 77.74 98.75 88.28
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: pre-university variables(c) 15,668.5 17,767.9 18,547.6 20,280.8
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test: school type(d) 116.9 131.7 175.6 166.0
(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2:(e)
i. model with secondary education 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39
ii. model withouth secondary education 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
ρ12
(f) 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.39
(s.e.) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
N. observations 48,303 52,871 55,782 57,096
Note.
(a) Chi2(64); (b) Chi2(16); (c) Chi2(24). Pre-university variables include A-level number, A-level score (UCAS formula) and A-level performance
by subject; (d) Chi2(10); (e) The Pseudo R2 is computed as: 1-(loglikelihood only-constant model/loglikelihood full model); (f) Coefficient of correlation
between the alternatives Law and Medicine and Quantitative Subjects.
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Table 4: Predicted probabilities (%), with standard errors and 95% confi-
dence intervals, of enrolling in the different study fields by social class
Subject group
Social Class QS NQS L&M
Prob left right Prob left right Prob left right
1981
I 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.16 0.13 0.18
II 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.15
IIINM 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.15
IIIM 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.10 0.14
IV 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.37 0.41 0.12 0.10 0.15
V 0.52 0.48 0.57 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.12 0.08 0.15
Armed forces 0.48 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.12 0.09 0.15
Inadequately described 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.12 0.10 0.15
Non workers 0.49 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.12 0.10 0.15
1982
I 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.17 0.14 0.19
II 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.16
IIINM 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15
IIIM 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.12 0.10 0.14
IV 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.16
V 0.47 0.43 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.16 0.12 0.21
Armed forces 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.14 0.11 0.17
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.13 0.10 0.15
Non workers 0.37 0.34 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.26 0.23 0.29
1983
I 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.18 0.16 0.20
II 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.12 0.17
IIINM 0.50 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.17
IIIM 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.16
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.16
V 0.52 0.48 0.57 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.10 0.07 0.14
Armed forces 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.19
Inadequately described 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.16 0.13 0.19
Non workers 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.14 0.12 0.17
1984
I 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19
II 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.16
IIINM 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.17
IIIM 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.12 0.16
IV 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.17
V 0.48 0.43 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.14 0.10 0.18
Armed forces 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.19
Inadequately described 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.15 0.13 0.18
Non workers 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.15 0.12 0.18
1985
I 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.17 0.15 0.19
II 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.15
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.15
IIIM 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.15
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16
V 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.12 0.09 0.15
Armed forces 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.15
Inadequately described 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.16
Non workers 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.13 0.11 0.16
36
continued
Subject group
Social Class QS NQS L&M
Prob left right Prob left right Prob left right
1986
I 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19
II 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16
IIIM 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.13 0.11 0.15
IV 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.16
V 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.37 0.33 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.21
Armed forces 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.36 0.33 0.39 0.12 0.09 0.15
Inadequately described 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.17
Non workers 0.50 0.46 0.53 0.36 0.33 0.39 0.14 0.12 0.17
1987
I 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.15 0.19
II 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16
IIINM 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.13 0.12 0.15
IIIM 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.14 0.12 0.16
IV 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.17
V 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.18
Armed forces 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.34 0.31 0.37 0.15 0.11 0.18
Inadequately described 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.15 0.13 0.18
Non workers 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.12 0.09 0.14
1989
I 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.16
II 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.14
IIINM 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.12 0.10 0.14
IIIM 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.14
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.14 0.12 0.16
V 0.52 0.47 0.56 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.18
Armed forces 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.14
Inadequately described 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.13 0.11 0.16
Non workers 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.12 0.09 0.14
1990
I 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.13 0.16
II 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.11 0.14
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15
IIIM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15
IV 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.15
V 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.18
Armed forces 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.10 0.08 0.13
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.15 0.13 0.18
Non workers 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.16
1991
I 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.14 0.13 0.16
II 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.11 0.14
IIINM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.12 0.11 0.14
IIIM 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.14
IV 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.14 0.12 0.16
V 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.16 0.12 0.20
Armed forces 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.15
Inadequately described 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.13 0.11 0.15
Non workers 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.14 0.11 0.17
Note. QS: ‘Quantitative Subjects’; NQS: ‘Non-Quantitative Subjects’; L&M: Law and
Medicine (see section 4.2). Social Classes: I (professional), II (intermediate), IIINM
(skilled non manual), IIIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled). Standard
errors and confidence intervals were computed using the delta method and Z critical values.
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Table 5: Average gross weekly occupational earnings of leaving students by subject - 8 groups
Cohorts of leaving QS NQS L&M
students Sciences Maths Technical Economics and Business Soft SS Art & Humanities Law Medicine
mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank mean rank
1985 422 1 476 6 443 4 475 5 429 2 431 3 504 7 605 8
1986 458 1 519 5 482 4 528 6 465 2 469 3 553 7 650 8
1987 506 1 571 5 530 4 589 6 523 2 525 3 647 7 730 8
1988 565 2 641 6 601 4 635 5 563 1 569 3 704 7 832 8
1989 617 1 700 6 656 4 699 5 628 3 627 2 829 7 899 8
1990 647 1 722 6 678 4 701 5 656 2 663 3 988 8 977 7
1991 682 2 743 6 720 4 725 5 675 1 696 3 984 7 1082 8
1992 706 2 766 6 744 4 754 5 701 1 722 3 1019 8 1103 7
1993 717 1 794 5 775 4 796 6 729 2 754 3 1027 7 1122 8
Note. The table reports average gross weekly occupational earnings (from the New Earnings Survey) of leaving students by subject and the rank for
each year. Average earnings are computed on the estimation samples (i.e. non-mature, non-overseas, unmarried students studying for a first degree
qualification and with A-levels). For the definition of the subject groups see section 5.1.
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Table 6: Predicted probabilities, with standard errors and 95% confidence intervals, of enrolling in the different study fields by
social class - flexible-threshold ordered probit model, 1985 USR data
Social class
Subject I II IIINM IIIM IV V Armed forces I.D. Non workers
Prob 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.23
Sciences left 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.20
right 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.26
Prob 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11
Soft Social Sciences left 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
right 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13
Prob 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26
Art and Humanities left 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24
right 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29
Prob 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11
Technical left 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.09
right 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.13
Prob 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Economics and Business left 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
right 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10
Prob 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07
Maths left 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
right 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.09
Prob 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Law left 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
right 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08
Prob 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Medicine left 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
right 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11
Note. QS: ‘Quantitative Subjects’; NQS: ‘Non-Quantitative Subjects’; L&M: Law and Medicine (see section 4.2). Social Classes: I (professional), II
(intermediate), IIINM (skilled non manual), IIIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled). Standard errors and confidence intervals were
computed using the delta method and Z critical values.
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Table 7: Predicted probabilities, with standard errors and 95% confidence intervals, of enrolling in the broader subject groups
by social class - flexible-threshold ordered probit model, 1985 USR data
Subject group
Social Class QS NQS L&M
Prob left right Prob left right Prob left right
I 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.17 0.15 0.20
II 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.15 0.13 0.17
IIINM 0.50 0.47 0.52 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.15 0.13 0.18
IIIM 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.15 0.13 0.18
IV 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.38 0.15 0.12 0.17
V 0.52 0.47 0.57 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.13 0.09 0.18
Armed forces 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.13 0.09 0.17
Inadequately described 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.15 0.12 0.18
Non workers 0.49 0.45 0.52 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.14 0.11 0.18
Note. QS: ‘Quantitative Subjects’; NQS: ‘Non-Quantitative Subjects’; L&M: Law and Medicine (see section 4.2). Social Classes: I (professional), II
(intermediate), IIINM (skilled non manual), IIIM (skilled manual), IV (partly skilled), V (unskilled). Standard errors and confidence intervals were
computed using the delta method and Z critical values.
